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Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics
Into Mayonnaise
STEPHEN

M. FELDMAN*

ABSTRACT

How do law andpolitics intertwine in Supreme Court adjudication?Traditionally, in law schools and political science departments, scholars refused to mix
law and politics. Law professors insisted that legal texts and doctrines controlled Supreme Court decision making, while political scientists maintained
that political ideologies dictated the justices'votes. In the late twentieth century,
some scholars in both disciplines sought to combine law and politics but still
conceived of the two as distinct. They attempted to stir law andpolitics together,
but ended with an oil-and-water type of mix; law and politics settled apart. The
best approach, as presented in this Article, is an institutional interpretivism,
positing that politics is necessarily an integralpart of legal interpretationand,
therefore, Supreme Court decision making. Institutionalinterpretivismhas significant ramifications. For scholars, it suggests thatfuture researchshould explore
the law-politics dynamic. The potential of this approach is demonstrated with
an analysis of the Affordable Care Act Case. Meanwhile, for Supreme Court
justices, institutional interpretivism suggests that the justices will continue to
decide cases as before, by sincerely interpreting legal texts and doctrines.
Politics is so deeply embedded in the judicial process that, in most instances,
the justices do not consciously consider their political ideologies. Yet, institutional interpretivism reveals that the justices naturally decide in accord with
their politics. Law and politics are joined so cohesively, in a stable emulsion,
that the justices do not even see their politics at work.
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INTRODUCTION

Law professors and political scientists refused to mix law and politics for
much of the twentieth century. Law professors insisted that legal texts and
doctrines controlled Supreme Court decision making,' while political scientists
maintained that political preferences dictated the justices' votes.2 On the law
side, many scholars believed that political considerations corrupted the judicial
process. On the political science side, many believed that judicial opinions
disguised political preferences with fancy window dressings.
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars on both sides of the
disciplinary divide have recognized a connection between law and politics, 3 yet
still, the traditional dichotomy persists.4 In the legal academy, for example, the
persistent harping about activist judges arises from the assumption that law
and politics are distinct.' Activist judges (and justices) supposedly pursue their
political agendas rather than follow the rule of law. Some Supreme Court
justices agree that law and politics must remain separate. "To expect judges to
take account of political consequences," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia in 2004,
"is to ask judges to do precisely what they should not do.",6 Meanwhile, political
1. E.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959); C. C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts: With a Summary of the Topics
Covered by the Cases viii-ix (2d ed. 1879) (preface to 1st ed.).
2. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model xv-xviii
(1993) (preface).
3. E.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of the People 323 (1 st ed. 2009) (law professor); Howard Gillman,
The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (1993)
(political scientist); Lee Epstein et al., Are Even Unanimous Decisions in the United States Supreme
Court Ideological?, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 699, 713 (2012) (political scientist, law professor, and judge
jointly labeling the Court "a mixed ideological-legalistic judicial institution"); Symposium: Political
Science and Law, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 467 (2011) (bringing together law professors and political
scientists).
4. Thomas M. Keck, Party Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal
Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REV.321, 331-34 (2007).
5. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Politial Seduction of the Law 17 (1990); Lino A.
Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does OriginalismAlways Provide the Answer?, 34 HARv.
J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 73, 74-75 (2011); see Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme
Right-Wing Courts are Wrong for America 41-44 (2005) (discussing judicial activism); Dan M. Kahan,
Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law,
125 HARv. L. REV.1, 4 (2011) (same).
6. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.).
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scientist Martin Shapiro declared: "Courts and judges always lie. Lying is the
nature of the judicial activity.'

7

To prove the point, Jeffrey A. Segal and

Harold J. Spaeth sought to test the "mythology of'judging."8 They devised a
"legal model," 9 which hypothesized that "the decisions of the Court are based
on the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the
Constitution, the intent of the framers, precedent, and a balancing of societal
interests." 10 The legal model, as constructed by Segal and Spaeth, demanded
that Supreme Court decisions be "objective, impartial, and dispassionate."'"
Segal and Spaeth then ran quantitative studies that supposedly revealed the
failings of the legal model. The evidence demonstrated "that traditional legal
factors, such as precedent, text, and intent, had virtually no impact" on Supreme
Court decision making.' 2 Segal and Spaeth were unsurprised; they had maintained all along that political ideologies determine the justices' votes. 3
Even more subtle scholars, though, stumble into the law-politics abyss.
Renowned first-amendment scholar Robert Post recently published a sophisticated "sociological account of the relationship between law and politics that
suggests how judicial statesmanship [read: politics] can further the essential
social functions of both law and politics.'

4

Judicial statesmanship, according to

Post, should be combined with judicial craftsmanship "because law and politics
should be mutually interdependent and sustaining."' i5 Yet, Post implicitly suggested that law and politics belong ultimately to separate realms. True, he
sought to mix them beneficially, but he nonetheless explained that "judicial craft
may at times appropriately be supplemented by judicial statesmanship."' 6 If
political considerations (judicial statesmanship) may "at times" supplement law
(judicial craft), then apparently, at other times, law may be pristine, untouched
by politics.' 7 More egregiously, in a well-received book about the influence of

law on politics, political scientist Gordon Silverstein worried that law sometimes can "undermine or kill" politics.' 8 He did not mean this in a good way.

The lethal judicial process can be "narrowing, formalizing, and hardening."'

9

7. Martin Shapiro, Judges As Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 155, 156 (1994).
8. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., The Supreme Court in the American Legal System 16-18 (2005).
9. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 2, at 33-53.
10. Id. at 32.
11. See id. at 4.
12. Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule Or Minority Will: Adherence To Precedent
On The U.S. Supreme Court xv (1999); see id. at 286-315 (summarizing quantitative evidence
regarding the influence of stare decisis on Supreme Court justices).
13. See id. at xv; Segal & Spaeth, supra note 2, at 65.
14. Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1319, 1323 (2010).
15. See id. at 1320.
16. Id. at 1323 (emphasis added).
17. Id.; see id. at 1324 (describing "politics and law as distinct phases").
18. Gordon Silverstein, Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics 3-4
(2009).
19. See id. at 2.
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This Article proposes a path around the law-politics abyss. Scholars, such as
Post, conceive of law and politics as distinct, even though they attempt to mix
them together. In the end, for these scholars, law and politics inevitably settle
apart, like oil and water. A handful of legal and political science scholars,
however, have attempted to combine law and politics in a more permanent
blend. Think of an emulsion, where two liquids are joined together to form a
stable substance, such as mayonnaise. But even these scholars have not explained the mechanism by which law and politics join. How, exactly, do law and
politics emulsify? The answer lies in an institutional interpretivism, which
reveals that politics is at the heart of the legal interpretive process. That is,
politics is inescapably an integral part of legal interpretation and, therefore, an
integral part of Supreme Court decision making. To be clear, institutional
interpretivism describes the process of Supreme Court decision making as it
actually occurs rather than prescribing how it ought to occur. The description,
however, necessarily limits the feasibility of normative prescriptions. If politics
is integral to legal interpretation, then it would be futile to recommend the
justices follow an interpretive method that ostensibly banishes politics by, for
example, divining an original constitutional meaning. 2 °
Part I of the Article draws on legal and political science literature to elaborate the traditional scholarly separation of law and politics. Part II begins by
describing the oil-and-water approach to Supreme Court decision making.
Part II next analyzes the writings of scholars who combine law and politics
more permanently, in an emulsion. The final section of Part II explains institutional interpretivism. Part III explores the ramifications of institutional interpretivism for, first, scholars and, then, Supreme Court justices. For scholars, on the
one hand, institutional interpretivism has potential for opening new directions in
future research. To demonstrate, Part III analyzes the monumental Affordable
Care Act Case (ACA Case)-NationalFederation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius. 2 1 In the ACA Case, decided in 2012, the Court upheld President
Barack Obama's flagship health insurance legislation, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010.22 Although Chief Justice John Roberts's
opinion repeatedly proclaimed that politics did not influence the justices,2 3 an
institutional interpretivist analysis reveals a vibrant law-politics dynamic. For
Supreme Court justices (and other judges), on the other hand, institutional
interpretivism is largely bereft of significance. Yet, this latter conclusion is itself
important. It paradoxically means that Roberts, Scalia, and other justices can be

20. E.g., Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin s Originalism,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 701 (2009); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52 (1994).
21. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119.
23. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577, 2579, 2608. Roberts wrote: "We do not consider whether the Act
embodies sound policies. That judgment is entrusted to the Nation's elected leaders. We ask only
whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions." Id. at 2577.
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simultaneously correct and incorrect when they insist that they decide cases
by focusing on the law and not contemplating politics. They are incorrect
because, as revealed by institutional interpretivism, politics is always part of
legal interpretation and, therefore, judicial decision making. They are correct,
though, because politics is so deeply embedded in the judicial process that, in
most cases, the justices do not consciously consider their political preferences
(and do not need to do so). Nonetheless, the justices decide harmoniously with
their politics. Law and politics are joined so cohesively-in an emulsion-that
the justices, quite reasonably, do not even see their politics at work.
A caveat is in order at the outset. Throughout this Article, I refer to particular
justices as either conservative or liberal. Although these labels are not especially
controversial, it is worth noting that they do not merely reflect my political
intuition. Rather, they correspond with various quantitative rankings of the
justices' political ideologies.2 4
I. THE PURISTS
Numerous scholars are purists. They advocate for an all-or-nothing approach:
Judicial decision making is either all law or all politics. If the scholar is in the
legal academy, then he or she maintains that the Court must decide cases pursuant to law by drawing on traditional legal materials such as case precedents,
statutes, and constitutional text.25 If the scholar is a political scientist, then he or
she maintains that politics alone determines Supreme Court votes.26
A. All Law
On the law side, the pristine legal approach is historically rooted in the work
of C.C. Langdell, the first dean of Harvard Law School, and his disciples.
Teaching in university-based law schools when they initially emerged after
the Civil War, the Langdellians treated law as a closed system of rules and
axiomatic principles that dictated judicial outcomes. 27 The legal system was
supposedly autonomous from societal influences. Thus, from the Langdellian
24. Lee Epstein et al., The Behavior of Federal Judges 106-16 (2013). This book compares its

rankings with the Martin-Quinn scores (accounting for changes over time), http://mqscores.wustl.edu/
index.php, and the Segal-Cover scores (quantifying Court nominees' perceived political ideologies

at the time of appointment), http://www.sunysb.edu/polsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf (data drawn from Jeffrey
Segal & Albert Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCl.
REV. 557-565 (1989); updated in Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of
Judicial Appointments (2005)). For yet another ranking (a more flexible one across issues), see
Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S. Clark, The Supreme Court's Many Median Justices, 106 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 847, 858-62 (2012).
25. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law Professorsin the
Pastand Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471, 477 (2004) (discussing the development of
the professional law teacher).
26. See Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and
Neglected Relationship, 27 LAW & Soc. INQuIRY 309, 311-12 (2002) (describing the gulf between law

professors and political scientists).
27. Langdell, supra note 1, at viii-ix.
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perspective, judges were not to contemplate political interests or even conceptions of justice.28 Judges were to do one thing: logically apply the rules and
principles in a mechanical fashion. 2 9
To be sure, nobody today would claim to be Langdellian, yet Langdellian
legal science still shapes the practices of law professors. The still-influential
'legal process' scholars of the latter twentieth century, including Henry Hart and
Alexander Bickel, emphasized the distinct processes of different governmental
institutions. 3 ° Courts and legislatures operated pursuant to processes unique to
their respective goals and functions. Courts, in particular, were to decide cases
by following the process of "reasoned elaboration:"'' Judges needed to articulate reasons for a decision, to explain those reasons in a detailed and coherent
manner, and to relate the decision to a relevant rule of law applied in a manner
logically consistent with precedent.3 2 In constitutional cases, reasoned elaboration translated into a requirement that judges decide pursuant to "neutral
principles," which supposedly precluded judges (or justices) from using rules or
principles that bore any political valence.3 3
An all-law approach is most clearly displayed today by scholars and justices
who claim to follow originalism in constitutional interpretation. Most originalists demand that judges discern the (supposedly) objective meaning of the
constitutional text as it was understood at the time of its adoption. 34 Constitutional meaning, from this perspective, is static, fixed at the time of its ratification, regardless of changing political and societal contexts. 35 Scalia has explained
that an originalist approach is "the only one that can justify courts in denying
force and effect to the unconstitutional enactments of duly elected legislatures... To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce

28. C.C. Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts 21 (2d ed. 1880).
29. See Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought From Premodemism to Postmodernism: An
Intellectual Voyage 90-105 (2000) (discussing Langdellian legal science). But cf., Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging 52-63 (2010) (arguing that
Langdellians were not pure formalists, but acknowledging that almost all legal historians characterize

them as such).
30. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 4, 180-83 (Tentative ed. 1958); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch

(1962).
31. Hart & Sacks, supra note 30, at 164-67.
32. Id.
33. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 15-35; see Bickel, supra note 30, at 49-59 (applying Wechsler's
concept of neutral principles).
34. See Bork, supra note 5, at 5-6, 143-44.
35. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All OriginalistsNow, in Constitutional Originalism: A Debate 1, 4
(2011) (articulating the "fixation thesis"). To be sure, the meaning of originalism itself is now contested.
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism,99 GEo. L.J. 713, 720-722 (2011) (discussing
the change from old orignalism, original intent, to new orginalism, original meaning); Peter J. Smith,
How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?,62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 708 (2011) (stating that
old originalism "has been mostly displaced by the 'new originalism"').
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that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it."' 36 Justice Clarence
Thomas, perhaps more than any other current justice, comes closest to following originalism consistently. For instance, Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow held that a student's father lacked standing to challenge the public
school recitation of the phrase, "under God," in the Pledge of Allegiance.37
Thomas, though, wrote a concurrence that revolved around an originalist analysis of the establishment clause. Referring to the text, contemporaneous interpretations from the time of the framing, and "prevailing" nineteenth-century
views of the clause,38 Thomas concluded that "[t]he text and history of the
Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is a federalism provision intended
to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments., 39 In other
words, from Thomas's originalist perspective, the establishment clause should
not be incorporated or applied against state and local governments,
which
4
should then be free to establish or support religious institutions. 0
A few political scientists now provide quantitative research supporting some
type of legal approach,4 1 despite Segal and Spaeth's rejection of the so-called
"legal model." 42 Using law models different from Segal and Spaeth's, these
other political scientists have concluded that legal texts and doctrines or "jurisprudential regimes" influence judicial decisions. 43 "The Supreme Court is not
simply a small legislature," explain Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer.44
"Law matters in Supreme Court decision making in ways that are specifically
jurisprudential. Specifically, jurisprudential regimes structure Supreme Court
decision making by establishing which case factors are relevant for decision
making and/or by setting the level of scrutiny the justices are to employ in
assessing case factors."45 Thus, for instance, Richards and Kritzer's quantitative
research shows that the application of the three-prong doctrinal test from Lemon

36. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original); see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1184-85

(1989).
37. 542 U.S. 1, 5, 17-18 (2004).
38. Id. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
39. Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
40. See id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
41. See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
273, 286-87 n.8 (2010) (identifying political science studies concluding that law matters); Barry
Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places, in What's Law Got to Do
With It?: What Judges Do, Why They Do It, and What's at Stake 143, 154-56 (Charles Gardner Geyh
ed., 2011) (same).
42. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 2, at 72-73; Spaeth & Segal, supra note 12 at 287, 314-15.
43. Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J.Richards, JurisprudentialRegimes and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 827, 839 (2003);
Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, JurisprudentialRegimes in Supreme Court Decision Making,
96 Am.POL. Sci. REv. 305, 315 (2002); see Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do With It? Judicial
Behavioralists Test the 'Legal Model' of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 492
(2001) (criticizing Segal and Spaeth's legal model).
44. Kritzer & Richards, supra note 43, at 315.
45. Id.
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v. Kurtzman influences whether the justices decide that a governmental action
violates the establishment clause.4 6 More broadly, other quantitative research
demonstrates that attorneys' legal arguments sway the justices.4 7
Such quantitative support is important, but even if it were lacking, one
should not dismiss the legal approach. Exactly because of a desire to conduct
scientific research, most political scientists insist on constructing models that
are amenable to quantitative testing. The studied phenomena must be reducible
to numeric data. 8 If a potential causal factor cannot adequately fit into a
testable model, then these political scientists are apt to relegate that factor to
irrelevance.4 9 A would-be causal factor that is not scientifically testable-not
falsifiable-is no more significant than a specter.50 Given this precondition for
much political science research, one should also recognize the qualitative
support for the legal approach. Like quantitative evidence, qualitative evidence
is empirical, though unlike quantitative evidence, it cannot be reduced to numeric data. Qualitative research explores relationships, actions, and events that
must be interpreted. It can include anecdotal evidence, but it also typically
suggests commonalities (and differences) among distinct phenomena. 5 ' Many
historians as well as researchers in some social (or human) sciences rely
extensively on qualitative evidence.5 2 Such research is generally not falsifiable
because testing conditions are not repeatable. A legal historian, for instance,
cannot repeat the constitutional framing to test a hypothesis about its causes.
Yet, qualitative research can still be empirically valid if the researcher provides
an illuminating narrative of the phenomena that is persuasively grounded on the
evidence.53

46. Id. at 835, 839; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (specifying the three prongs
as purpose, effects, and entanglements).
47. Andrew McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: When and How
Do LegalArguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 259, 274-75 (2007).
48. Michael G. Roskin et al., Political Science: An Introduction 12 (9th ed. 2006); Colorado State
Glossary of Key Terms, http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/glossary/, [hereinafter Glossary].
49. "Judicial decision making ... is a practice that mixes legal, strategic, and attitudinal considerations in ways that cannot be fully isolated by scientific investigation." Mark A. Graber, Legal,
Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide During the Civil War and Reconstruction, in The
Supreme Court and American Political Development 33, 35 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006);
cf., Cornell Clayton & Howard Gillman, Introduction, in The Supreme Court in American Politics: New
Institutionalist Interpretations 1, 1-2 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) (noting that there
are important unanswered questions and describing the narrow focus of the attitudinal model).
50. E.g., Segal et al., supra note 8, at 20-21. The falsifiability thesis, conceptualized by Karl Popper,
is itself controversial. Susan Haack, Federal Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction-And a Reconstruction, 5 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 394, 394-97 (2010).
51. Roskin et al., supra note 48, at 12, 26-28; Glossary, supra note 48.
52. For discussions of the human sciences, a term used more frequently in continental studies, see
Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Beginning of Philosophy 30-31 (Rod Coltman trans., 1998); Charles Taylor,
Philosophy and the Human Sciences (1985).
53. See Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century 97-100, 139 (1997); Lisa Webley,
Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal
Research 926, 940-45 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010) (explaining the various methods of
empirical research and how to evaluate the validity of these methods); see also Ellie Fossey et al.,
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Qualitative evidence of the legal approach is boundless. Most lawyers,
judges, and law professors would (and do) testify to the sincerity of their reliance on legal texts and doctrines. 54 From their experiences, the invocation of
legal materials is significant, not immaterial subterfuge. With specific regard to
judicial decision making, Supreme Court justices (and other judges) are subject to professional norms that demand they identify and refer to relevant legal
texts and doctrines when deciding a case.5 5 The justices thus not only discuss
relevant precedents, statutes, and constitutional provisions in their judicial
opinions-which admittedly might be for public consumption, to help legitimate their decisions-but also discuss such textual and doctrinal sources among
themselves when behind closed doors, during post-oral argument conferences.5 6
Perhaps more to the point, the justices sometimes bargain and negotiate among
themselves about the contents of their majority opinions, as if the precise
wording of a single paragraph or even a single sentence mattered. 57 Furthermore, the justices claim that they never openly discuss or consider partisan
politics in relation to pending cases. 58
B. All Politics
Whereas Segal and Spaeth's complete dismissal of the legal approach is
unpersuasive, their argument that justices vote in accordance with their personal
policy preferences is powerful. Perhaps more so than any other political scientists, Segal and Spaeth represent the all-politics position. According to their
so-called attitudinal model, "the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the
facts of the case vis-A-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. 5 9
And a justice's personal policy preferences (or ideological attitudes) are formed
exogenously to the legal system; that is, the justice's preferences do not form

Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research, 36 Austl. & N.Z. J. Psychiatry 717, 720-23
(2002) (noting how qualitative studies should be evaluated).
54. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 12-13 (1991) (specifying six "modalities of
argument" judges use to decide constitutional cases); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process (1921) (discussing how Cardozo decided cases).
55. See Steven J. Burton, Judging in Good Faith (1992) (emphasizing judges' good faith responsibility to apply the law); Tamanaha, supra note 29, at 194 (emphasizing that judges internalize a
"commitment to engage in the good-faith application of the law").
56. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of JurisprudentialConsiderationson
Supreme Court Decisionmaking:A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 135, 137 (2006)
(discussing how the justices appear to take law seriously); see, e.g., The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985): The Private Discussions Behind Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions 415-17
(Del Dickson ed., 2001) (noting the discussions in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)).
57. Paul Wahlbeck, et al., Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United
States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 294 (1998).
58. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407,
1407 n.2 (2001); see Linda Greenhouse, Another Kind of Bitter Split, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at Al

(reporting that justices claim they do not discuss politics).
59. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 2, at 65.
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because of his or her institutional position within the federal judiciary.6° Segal
and Spaeth gave this stark example: "Simply put, [William] Rehnquist votes the
way he does because he is extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall voted
the way he did because he is extremely liberal.",6 1 Most important, -Segal and
Spaeth support their conclusion-that Supreme Court decisions are "overwhelmingly explained by the attitudes and values of the justices"62-with
extensive quantitative evidence. 63 For instance, in a study comparing the justices' ideologies with their votes in criminal cases, Segal and Spaeth concluded
that "justices who are more liberal have substantially higher rates of support for
accused criminals than do justices who are more conservative. Indeed, the fit of
the model is extremely high, with a correlation between ideology and votes of
,,6 From Segal and Spaeth's perspective, the attitudinal model is far
.78 ....
superior to the legal model as a method for predicting "judicial behavior" 65 or,
in other words, the justices' votes. 66
While attitudinalists tend to stress the quantitative support for their approach,
one should recognize that qualitative evidence also lends credence. An obvious
example that demonstrates the power of politics in Supreme Court decision
making is the five-to-four decision, Bush v. Gore, which resolved the 2000
presidential election. 67 Numerous scholars, even those who believe that law
ordinarily shapes the Court's decisions, argued that this case could not be explained in any way other than as a pure partisan power grab.6 8 The conservative
majority claimed to apply equal protection reasoning, but it was unique and
inconsistent with anything they did before or since. 69 Based on this flimsy
justification, the five conservative justices held for George W. Bush and effectively installed him as the next president (which allowed him to nominate
conservative replacements for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor). °
Michael Klarman underscored the Court's blatant partisanship by rhetorically

60. Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostbehavioralistApproaches to Judicial
Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 611 (2000).

61. Id.
62. Spaeth & Segal, supra note 12, at xv.
63. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 2, at 208-60; see Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good
Citizens? An Economic Analysis of InternalizedNorms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1599 n.24, 1600 n.25
(2000) (summarizing quantitative studies that support the attitudinal model).
64. Segal et al., supra note 8, at 319.

65. Whittington, supra note 60, at 602; see id. at 611 (discussing success of attitudinal model in
predicting case outcomes).
66. Segal and Spaeth have published a new version of their influential 1993 book. Jeffrey A. Segal &
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002).
67. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
68. Howard Gillman, The Votes That Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential
Election 2-5, 185-89 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. Cm. L. Rav. 757, 759
(2001).
69. 531 U.S. at 104-10; Gillman, supra note 68, at 141-43; Balkin, supra note 58, at 1426-35.
70. See 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a principled application of the
majority's equal protection reasoning would have also invalidated the original method of counting votes
in Florida); Jeffrey Toobin, Too Close to Call (2001) (detailed political account of the election dispute).
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asking: "Had all the other facts in the Florida election imbroglio remained the
same, but the situation of the two presidential candidates been reversed, does
anyone seriously believe that the conservative Justices would have reached the
7
same result? '

Despite such quantitative and qualitative support, the attitudinal model is
not the only political science approach to emphasize politics in judicial decision
making. Rational choice theorists, such as Lee Epstein, maintain that the justices generally want to vote in accordance with their personal policy preferences
but that various institutional constraints might compel the justices to alter their
behaviors. Epstein, Jack Knight, and Andrew D. Martain elaborate the rational
choice or strategic model: "(1) judges make choices in order to achieve certain
goals [usually policy preferences]; (2) judges act strategically in the sense that
their choices depend on their expectations about the choices of other actors; and
(3) these choices are structured by the institutional setting in which they are
made."7 2 Thus, for instance, while Justice Thomas believes that the establishment clause does not apply to state and local governments, he might nonetheless
vote with other conservatives who believe otherwise. By strategically modifying his behavior, Thomas enables the conservatives to form a majority and to
interpret the establishment clause narrowly, thus allowing governments to propa73
gate and bolster religion more than liberals would allow.
Another approach emphasizing politics maintains that the justices vote in
accordance with the predominant political regime. The renowned Robert Dahl
wrote the seminal article in this genre in 1957. T Based on an empirical study
of cases where the Supreme Court had invalidated congressional statutes,
Dahl observed that, contrary to popular assumptions, the Court did not protect
minorities from majoritarian overreaching. As Dahl phrased it, "it would appear
to be somewhat naive to assume that the Supreme Court either would or could
play the role of Galahad., 75 To the contrary, the Court inevitably was an integral
"part of the dominant national alliance., 76 The Court, therefore, decided cases
71. Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of ConstitutionalHistory, 89 CALUF. L. REv.
1721, 1725 (2001).
72. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context of Judging,
47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783, 798 (2003). The authors add that most rational choice studies assume
that judges pursue their policy preferences, but they emphasize that judges might sometimes pursue
other goals. Id. at 798-99; see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The
Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 215, 216 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (explaining strategic approach).
73. E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding a display of the Ten Commandments).
For Thomas's argument that an originalist interpretation of the establishment clause suggests that the
clause should not apply to state and local governments, see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957); see Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court (1964)
(discussing political jurisprudence). But see Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial
Supremacy 42-45 (2007) (discussing criticisms of Dahl's thesis).
75. Dahl, supra note 74, at 284.
76. ld. at 293.
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in harmony with the interests and values of that dominant political alliance ' or
77
regime. "As an element in the political leadership of the dominant alliance,
Dahl tersely stated, "the Court of course supports the major policies of the
alliance. 78 Terri Peretti recently reiterated this regime politics approach:
'Regimists' focus on the incentives and power of politicians to construct
courts in particular ways that would benefit the ruling regime. By granting
jurisdiction, encouraging certain types of litigation, and selecting specific
justices with specific political and jurisprudential views, elected officials
enlist the Court as a partner in their electoral and policy aims. 9
Occasionally, when one dominant political regime replaces another, the
Court might be temporarily aligned with the former regime. During such times,
conflict between the Court and, for instance, the Congress-if it is controlled by
the new regime-might be intense. Yet, before long, the Court is likely to be
consolidated with the new regime, often because of new appointments to the
Court.80 Thus, from the regime politics perspective, the justices rarely depart
too far from the political mainstream: "[Tihe policy views dominant on the
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the
lawmaking majorities of the United States. ' 8 ' An example is Brown v. Board of
Education, which held unconstitutional de jure racial segregation in public
schools.8 2 Regimists maintain that Brown did not show the Court boldly championing the rights of a racial minority in the face of majoritarian pressures.83
Instead, the Court in Brown followed the interests and values of a dominant
national political coalition or regime that favored the eradication of Jim Crow.
White southerners who supported legalized racial segregation had become
national outliers; the Court forced them84to acquiesce to more mainstream views,
as understood from a national vantage.
The regime politics approach, it should be recognized, can be understood as a
specific type of rational choice theory. Regimists agree with rational choice
theorists insofar as both groups maintain that institutional constraints prevent

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Peretti, supra note 41, at 275.
80. Dahl, supra note 74, at 293; Keck, supra note 4, at 322, Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and
the National Political Order: Collaborationand Confrontation, in The Supreme Court and American

Political Development 117 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
81. Dahl, supra note 74, at 285; see Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 224-25
(1960) (presenting similar view).
82. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991).
84. Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights (2000); Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980). Dahl argued that Brown might not
have actually conferred legitimacy on a policy of a dominant national alliance--because a strong
political coalition supporting desegregation had not yet formed-but that Brown nonetheless conformed
to an explicit or implicit norm widely held by political leaders. Dahl, supra note 74, at 293-94.

2014]

SUPREME CouRT ALCHEMY

justices from arrantly voting pursuant to their personal policy preferences. 85 The
difference between regimists and other rational choice theorists is that regimists
emphasize that the overriding institutional constraints on the justices arise from
other political actors in the predominant regime, including members of the
congressional and executive branches.86 The justices must behave (or vote) in
ways that are likely to discourage retributive "attacks on their independence and
overrides of their decisions. 8 7 In fact, since rational choice theorists usually
assume that justices would vote according to their personal policy preferences
but for various institutional constraints, one might even view the regime politics
approach as a stylized version of the attitudinal model.88
Nonetheless, many political scientists consider the regime politics approach
and the attitudinal model to be opposed against each other in at least two ways.
First, attitudinalists emphasize the justices' personal policy preferences but do
not speak to the origins of those preferences, whereas regimists care deeply
about such origins. Attitudinalists write as if policy preferences "arrive like
orphans in the night at the Court's doorstep, ' 89 while regimists analyze how
preferences "are deliberately planted there by the dominant governing coalition." 90 Second, the justices' personal policy preferences sometimes appear to
diverge from the values of the predominant regime-for example, when one
dominant regime is replacing another. In such instances, attitudinalists insist
that the justices follow their personal preferences, while regimists insist that the
justices follow partisan (or regime) values-albeit of the prior dominant regime. 9 ' Basically, attitudinalists stress the freedom and independence of the
justices: The "justices behave like any other political actor-only more so, since
justices do not have electoral incentives to compromise their ideological preferences." 92 Meanwhile, regimists stress that the justices are, in effect, constantly
looking over their shoulders: The justices are constrained at least as much as
other political actors, even if the justices need not worry about re-election, and
thus the justices largely remain loyal to the predominant regime that brought
them to office.93
II. A LITTE BIT OF

THIS,

A LITTLE BIT

OF THAT

Quantitative and qualitative evidence support both law and politics as being
causal factors in Supreme Court decision-making. Given that numerous law
85. Lee Epstein, Studying Law and Courts, in Contemplating Courts 1, 5-6 (1995).
86. Segal et al., supra note 8, at 35-37.
87. Id. at 37.
88. Keck, supra note 4, at 322, 328.
89. Peretti, supra note 41, at 289.
90. Id.
91. Keck, supra note 4, at 322, 328.
92. Whittington, supra note 60, at 606.
93. Keck, supra note 4, at 322, 328; see Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a 'Majoritarian'
Institution?, 2010 Sup. CT. REv. 103 (arguing that the regimist approach is ambiguous because the
definition of the dominant regime and what constitutes following it often seem to change).
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professors and political scientists are purists, subscribing to an all-or-nothing
approach, such evidence might be problematic: How can decision making be
all law or all politics if evidence corroborates both approaches? An obvious
solution to this problem is to posit that both law and politics influence the
justices' votes. And indeed, while many law professors and political scientists
remain purists, an increasing number of scholars in both disciplines now argue
that some mix of law and politics is at play. But this solution engenders a
further problem: How do law and politics combine or interrelate in the decision
making process? This Part discusses two possibilities: first, politics sometimes
affects Supreme Court decision making, but politics and law nonetheless remain
distinct; and second, politics and law are integrally entwined so that decision
making is always partly political.
A. Together-Like Oil and Water
Perhaps the most common method for mixing law and politics is to maintain
that politics qua politics sometimes enters the judicial decision making process
even though law and politics remain independent and separate. At least within
the legal academy, the crux of this approach is the belief that traditional legal
materials-texts and doctrines-control most cases, but occasionally, in the
gaps or on the edges of the law, political (or policy) considerations become
relevant. 94 From this perspective, many disputes make easy cases: cases that are
so obviously governed by uncontested rules that they are unlikely to reach even
a trial court.95 For instance, a testator must have his or her will witnessed by
two individuals; failure to do so results in an invalid will, not in a Supreme
Court decision. 96 Political considerations enter the judicial calculus only in
those'9 7cases where a gap or area of doubt in the law exists, where "the law runs
out."

Significantly, advocates of this approach insist that law and politics exist in
distinct realms. Law and politics can be stirred together, we might say, but they
ultimately remain segregrated, like oil and water.98 Some legal process scholars,
for example, maintained that a judge, in appropriate situations, should apply the
law "in the way which best serves the principles and policies it expresses." 99
Yet, the judicial process of reasoned elaboration neatly and safely cabined such
political concerns so that they would supposedly intrude into judicial deliberations only in certain narrowly defined circumstances. The law supposedly
94. Cf., Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that judges make law in the gaps); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 113-14

(1921) (same).
95. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985).
96. Michael S. Moore, The Plain Truth About Legal Truth, 26 HAlv. J.L. &PuB. PoLy 23, 24 (2003).
97. Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Cornerof the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1717, 1729 (1988).
98. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 119 (1961) (arguing that legal rules have "a core of

certainty and a penumbra of doubt"); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1 (1949)
(arguing "for the discussion of policy in the gap of [legal] ambiguity").
99. Hart & Sacks, supra note 30, at 165; see id. at 166-67 (discussing the use of policy).
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controlled many cases without politics playing any role. A Supreme Court tax
decision illustrates this outlook.' ° The eight-justice majority opinion recognized that its proposed interpretation of the relevant statutory provision would
allow certain corporate shareholders to realize "a 'double windfall."' ' Regardless, the Court deflected such political considerations as beyond its domain:
here to receive these
"Because the Code's plain text permits the taxpayers
10 2
benefits, we need not address this policy concern."
Even political scientists who are fully committed to the attitudinal model,
including Segal and Spaeth, acknowledge that law can feasibly govern cases,
particularly in the lower courts." 3 "[P]recedent certainly matters to lower court
judges," writes Segal, Spaeth, and Sara Benesh.' °4 "[N]o such judge worthy of
the name is likely to uphold prohibitions on previability abortions, require the
segregation of students on racial grounds, or allow public school officials to
lead students in prayer service, regardless of the judge's [political] predilections .... 105 Of course, at the level of the Supreme Court, where hard cases
are the norm, Segal and Spaeth insist that legal texts and doctrines control the
justices' votes in only the rarest of instances, though they grudgingly admit that
it sometimes appears to happen--obviously, however, not often enough to cause
them to waver in their commitment to the attitudinal model.10 6 Some rational
choice theorists also assert that legal texts and doctrines are among the institutional constraints that can compel the justices to deviate from their personal
policy preferences. Justices "are strategic actors who take into consideration the
constraints they encounter as they attempt to introduce their policy preferences
into the law," writes a group of political science researchers,10 7 who then add
the form of formal rules or informal norms that
that "these constraints often take
'0 8
limit the [justices'] choices."'
In short, scholars on both the legal and political science sides recognize
that quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that some mix of law and
politics goes into Supreme Court decision making.' 0 9 In fact, some scholars
have attempted to demonstrate that neither an all-law nor an all-politics ap-

100. Gitlitz v. C.I.R., 531 U.S. 236 (2001).
101. Id. at 219.
102. Id. at 220.
103. For an extensive quantitative study of the role of law and political ideology in the lower courts,
see Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2007).
104. Segal et al., supra note 8, at 30.

105. Id.
106. Id.; Spaeth & Segal, supra note 12, at 5-7.
107. Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to
Supreme CourtDecision-Making, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches
43, 46 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
108. Id.; see Whittington, supra note 60, at 612 (describing rational choice new institutionalism).
109. Law professor, Brian Tamanaha, draws on multiple sources, including quantitative studies of
the lower courts, to support his concept of balanced realism, an oil-and-water approach (he admires
Cardozo's description of judging, including the notion that judges generally follow the law but must
sometimes fill in gaps). Tamanaha, supra note 29, at 125-31.
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proach suffices to describe the complexity of the judicial process. Frank Cross,
a law professor, and Blake Nelson, a political scientist, joined together to con110
duct a quantitative study of the Supreme Court directed toward this purpose.
They rejected all the univocal descriptions of the Court's decision making: "An
assumption that judges are naively legal or political or utterly strategic is too
simple to come close to describing the reality of decisionmaking."11 Instead,
Cross and Nelson found "distinct evidence of ideological decisionmaking,
12
legal-model decisionmaking, and strategic institutional decisionmaking."'
Thus, they concluded that "[j]ustices are driven by a complex mix of factorslegal, ideological, and strategic. Models are considerably simplified by an
assumption of a single-peaked preference along one dimension."' 1 3 Even so,
Cross and Nelson conceptualized law and politics as distinct. One could presumably measure the effects of legal materials, standing alone, just as one could
presumably measure the effects of political ideology (or political preferences),
standing alone. "Our results show that judicial [read: political] ideology is an
important factor in Court decisionmaking in a large set of cases. They also show
that the law actually matters and drives decisionmaking in other cases, governed
by certain types of legal rules. The independent effects of institutional deference
reveal some role for strategic decisionmaking as well, over and above naive
legal and political decisionmaking. ' 114
'
B. An Emulsion
The oil-and-water mix of law and politics represents an advance on the
all-law and all-politics approaches because it recognizes the quantitative and
qualitative evidence supporting both approaches. Even so, the oil-and-water
approach retains a vestigial remnant of the purist approaches: Namely, it retains
the vision of law and politics as dichotomous, as sharply distinct. This section,
therefore, sketches an alternative method for mixing law and politics that
overcomes this dichotomy. As an advance over the oil-and-water approach,
this alternative does not merely posit that law and politics are occasionally
stirred together; rather, they are fully integrated into a permanent emulsion. An
emulsion, like mayonnaise or milk, is stable; the components do not settle or
separate out. With foreknowledge, one can identify the elements that went into
the emulsion-law and politics-but the final product is a unified whole-a
Supreme Court decision.

110. Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1437 (2001).
111. Id. at 1492.
112. Id. at 1491.
113. Id. at 1492.
114. Id.; see Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Publicand Academic Debates
About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 743, 774 (2005) (approving the Cross and Nelson study).
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1. What Is the Law-Politics Emulsion?
Some regimists, law professors as well as political scientists, fall into this
emulsification category. In discussing Supreme Court decisions, they tend to
emphasize the surrounding political contexts, thus accentuating how the justices
largely follow the political mainstream. They also, though, discuss relevant
legal texts and doctrines and the justices' reliance on these legal materials; law,
from this perspective, does not merely mirror social and economic interests. 115
For instance, law professor L. A. Powe unequivocally views the Court "as a part
of a ruling regime doing its bit to implement the regime's policies."'1 16 The
Court "is staffed by men (and in recent years a few women) who for the most
part are in tune with their times."' 1 7 Yet, Powe also writes about legal developments from the inside, from the lawyer's or judge's perspective. In his most
recent book, on the history of the Supreme Court, he explains: "I have written
[this book] in the context of history with the insights of political science but
remaining true to the ways the justices perceived their own work. Doctrine may
be driven by events and the intellectual currents of the times, but nevertheless
the justices, for the most part, take it seriously."" 8 In an earlier book, on the
Warren Court, Powe examined Supreme Court decisions dealing with legislative apportionment that required the Court to displace settled democratic practices and overrule earlier decisions. In 1946, before Earl Warren became Chief
Justice, a plurality had held in Colegrove v. Green that a state legislative
drawing of congressional district lines presented a nonjusticiable political question.11 9 In 1962, however, the Warren Court rejected Colegrove and instead
held, in Baker v. Carr, that an allegation of disproportional representation and
concomitant vote dilution constituted a justiciable claim, whether for a state
20
legislature, as in Baker, or for the House of Representatives, as in Colegrove.,
The Baker holding, that disputes over legislative apportionment were justiciable, engendered a series of cases challenging apportionment practices.
Most famously, Wesberry v. Sanders, 121 focusing on congressional districts,
and Reynolds v. Sims, 122 focusing on state legislative districts, established the
doctrine of "one person, one vote. ''1 23 After extensively elaborating the doctri115. For examples of a law professor and a historian maintaining that law mirrors social and
economic interests, see Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law (1973) (law professor);
Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror (1989) (historian). "
116. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008, at ix (2009)
[hereinafter Elite]. Powe considers himself a lawyer-he clerked for Justice William O. Douglas-but
he holds a joint appointment at the University of Texas in the School of Law and the Government
Department. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics xiii, xv (2000) [hereinafter
Politics].
117. Elite, supra note 116, at ix.
118. Id. at viii.
119. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
120. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
121. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
122. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
123. Politics, supra note 116, at 242.
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nal arguments debated in these cases, 124 including dissenting and concurring
as well as majority positions, Powe discussed how these decisions sparked political opposition, especially from those legislators who were likely to lose their
seats because of the judicially forced redistricting.12 5 Thus, Baker and its
progeny could certainly be understood as radical, as breaking new doctrinal
ground, and as bold defenses of the right to participate in democratic processes.
But Powe argued that the Court's decisions "conformed to the values that
enjoyed significant national support in the mid-1960s."' 26 Indeed, the same year
the Court decided Wesberry and Reynolds, a national political coalition would
produce the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, then one year later, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.127
Clearly, for Powe, law matters, yet regime politics also influences the justices. A handful of political scientists display a similar outlook. These political
scientists fall into two overlapping categories of research: American Political
Development (APD) and historical institutionalism. In a definitive book, Karen
Orren and Stephen Skowronek explain that APD "grapples with.., the historical construction of politics, and with political arrangements of different origins
in time operating together."' 28 APD is primarily concerned with using the
histories of these political arrangements to explain political change or development (and resistance to change).' 2 9 When it comes to research on law and the
courts, APD asserts that law and politics are, in effect, emulsified. The question
whether Supreme Court decision making is a matter of law or politics, explain
Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, should be "conceptualized as a debate over the
respective influences of internal and external factors ....with law being an
important potential internal influence.... and electoral politics being a significant potential [external] influence."'' 30 Thus, unlike all-politics political scientists, such as the attitudinalists, APD political scientists maintain that "the
interplay of the internal and external taking place in courts gives them a certain
autonomy from ordinary politics at certain times and in certain areas that leads
them to ignore, resist, and even disregard robust political pressure."'' 3' Howard
Gillman, for instance, described how the early-twentieth century Court-the
Lochner-era Court-continued to apply nineteenth-century legal doctrines even

124. Id. at 199-203, 239-52.
125. Id. at 252-55.
126. Id. at 215.
127. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq.; Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-(d), 2000(a)-2000(h)(4); Politics, supra note 116, at 232-37,
260-65.
128. Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development x (2004).
129. Id. at 6.
130. Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, Introduction, in The Supreme Court and American Political
Development 1, 18 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).

131. Id. at 19.
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environment was radically changing and renderthough the surrounding political
32
ing the doctrine unworkable. 1
Kahn and Kersch emphasize that the autonomy engendered by the interplay
between the internal and external-between law and politics-is "distinctive to
courts as institutions."1 33 The resultant APD focus on courts as institutions has
led many APD scholars to be characterized as "new institutionalists,' ' 134 and
more specifically, "historical institutionalists."' 135 As the name implies, historical institutionalists, such as Howard Gillman and Mark Graber, are concerned
primarily with the historical development of institutions, particularly legal and
judicial institutions. 136 Like regimists, historical institutionalists are interested
in understanding the origins of the justices' political preferences. They aim "to
explore the broader cultural and political contexts of judicial decision making
[and explain] how judicial attitudes are themselves constituted and structured by
the Court as an institution and by its relationship to other institutions in the
political system at particular points in history."' 137 Historical institutionalists
view law as a component of the judicial institution that constrains and directs
decision making. 138 Supreme Court justices, therefore, talk about legal texts and
doctrines because they truly believe these legal materials matter, not merely
because they need to rationalize their political preferences or goals.1 39 Legal
materials (and legal reasoning) matter because of an institutional imperative: the
professional mission of justices sitting on the Supreme Court to interpret and
apply the law. 140
One ambiguity lingers in much of the work of the emulsification law professors and political scientists. While they see law and politics as integrally

132. Gillman, supra note 3; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum
hours legislation).
133. Kahn & Kersch, supra note 130, at 18.
134. Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, The "New Institutionalism," and the Future of
Public Law, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 89, 89 (1988). On "old institutionalism," see Cornell W. Clayton,
The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms, in Supreme Court
Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 15, 16-22 (Comell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman
eds., 1999).
135. Graber, supra note 26, at 317; see Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals 6, 509-10 n.12 (1997)
(discussing historical institutionalism). Rational choice scholars are also sometimes characterized as
new institutionalists because of their emphasis on institutional constraints, though there are important
differences between rational choice scholars and historical institutionalists. Whittington, supra note 60,
at 608-16.
136. Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech (1991); Gillman, supra note 3.
137. Cornell Clayton & Howard Gillman, Introduction, in The Supreme Court in American Politics:
New Institutionalist Interpretations 1, 2 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999).
138. Peretti, supra note 41, at 290; see Whittington, supra note 60, at 622 (viewing legal doctrines
as cognitive maps).
139. Gillman, supra note 3, at 11-12; Graber, supra note 49, at 35; Whittington, supra note 60, at
619,629.
140. Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New
Institutionalist Approaches 65, 79-80, 86 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999);
Whittington, supra note 60, at 623.
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entwined, so that Supreme Court decision making is always partly political,
they rarely attempt to explain the means by which politics enters the adjudicative process. Put in metaphorical terms, what is the recipe for creating the
law-politics emulsion? When Powe touches on this question, he becomes
uncharacteristically (for him) vague. "Law is not just politics, "'44 he writes,
"but judges are aware of the political context of their decisions and are, like
everyone else, influenced by the economic, social, and intellectual currents of
American society." 14 2 Barry Friedman, another historically-minded and regimeoriented law professor, offers a fuller explanation, but he still does not delve
into the details. One might say that Friedman deals with the mechanism for
emulsifying law and politics at a macro- rather than micro-level. He discusses
how political pressure is brought to bear on the justices and how presidents seek
to appoint justices who will implement their political-constitutional visions, yet
for the most part, he does not explain how politics enters into the justices'
deliberations of specific cases.' 4 3 Friedman, quite sensibly, views the development of constitutional meaning as arising from a type of "dialogue" between the
people and the justices that generates a dialectical synthesis.'44
[T]he modem era is one of a symbiotic relationship between popular opinion
and judicial review. The Court will get ahead of the American people on some
issues, like the death penalty or perhaps school desegregation itself. On others,
such as gay rights, it will lag behind. But over time, with what is admittedly
great public discussion, but little in the way of serious overt attacks on judicial
145
power, the Court and the public will come into basic alliancewith each other.
Still, how do the people and the Court achieve a "basic alliance" in any
particular case? How, in other words, does politics enter the judicial calculus?
Gillman is a historical institutionalist who nearly answers this question. Contrary to all-politics political scientists, Gillman does not dismiss law as irrelevant merely because justices do not apply legal texts and doctrines in a
mechanical fashion. 146 Instead, he argues that, within the institution of the
Supreme Court, the justices feel a "formal responsibility to decide actual legal
disputes based on their best understanding of the law." 147 Judicial decisions,
including at the Supreme Court, "are considered legally motivated if they
represent a judge's sincere belief that their decision represents their best understanding of what the law requires.' 148 A justice, in other words, is ordinarily
motivated to interpret the law accurately rather than to pursue explicitly and

141. Politics, supra note 116, at xiv.
142. Id.
143. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 212-25 (discussing FDR's court-packing plan); id. at 313-22
(discussing Reagan's efforts to appoint conservative justices).
144. Id. at 367.
145. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
146. Gillman, supra note 43, at 485-86.
147. Gillman, supra note 140, at 80.
148. Gillman, supra note 43, at 486.
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openly his or her political goals. 149 When a justice interprets and applies the
law, however, the justice often must exercise discretion. Here, Gillman follows
Ronald Dworkin by distinguishing strong from weak discretion. 150 Strong discretion allows an individual, to a great extent, to do whatever he or she wishes
within wide parameters: For example, 'go to the supermarket, and buy some
fruit.' Weak discretion requires the individual to exercise judgment in following
more specific directions or orders: 'Go to the supermarket, and buy the ripest
pears.' Justices (and other judges), according to Dworkin and Gillman, exercise
weak rather than strong discretion, even in hard cases. 15 ' Thus, "legal norms
can matter even if they cannot be mechanically applied-that is, .. . law can
motivate and even shape a decision without determining the result."' 152 The
justice, we might say, still must decide which pears are ripest. Moreover, the
judicial exercise of weak discretion "often"' 5 3 coincides with the judge's "political ideology."' 154 Indeed, political attitudes sometimes can transform "to the
point that they become internal to the practice [of judging]. ' 55
In sum, Gillman is an emulsification theorist: He maintains that politics is
always part of legal interpretation. At one point, he even writes: "Meaning is
extracted from [legal] sources by interpreters, and interpreters cannot help but
be influenced by their particular cultural, social, and political context.' 56 Yet,
when he attempts to explain how politics enters the judicial calculus, he wavers
and introduces ambiguities. Many of his explanatory statements include vague
qualifiers, such as "often" and "to the extent."' 57 In his explanations, Gillman
walks to the edge, but hesitates-then gets tangled in his ropes. He writes:
"[S]o long as judges draw on beliefs about public values, because they believe
the law recognizes this as an inevitable part of interpretation (in some circumstances).... then the influence of legality is at work."' 5 8 Why are public values
or politics part of interpretation only "in some circumstances"? Gillman does
not elaborate, but his wavering harkens back to an oil-and-water approach to
law and politics. In particular, when Gillman follows Dworkin, he implicitly
suggests that politics enters the adjudicative process through the exercise of
judicial discretion. A judge (or justice) might often exercise discretion, but does
not always do so. From this perspective, if the judge does not need to exercise
discretion in a specific case, then politics apparently does not enter the calculus.
Legal interpretation, it seems, might still sometimes be pure, unaffected by
politics.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 486-87.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31-33 (1978).
Gillman, supra note 43, at 489.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
Gillman, supra note 3, at 16-17.
Gillman, supra note 43, at 489.
Id. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
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Why might an emulsification theorist such as Gillman settle for this unsatisfactory explanation? One possible answer is that Gillman, like Friedman, works
more on the macro- than the micro-level. As a historical institutionalist, Gillman
seeks to describe how the Court as an institution changes (and resists change) in
particular political environments. In describing institutional change, Gillman
stakes out a distinctive position within the discipline of political science-a
position in opposition to the all-politics quantitative political scientists-by
maintaining that justices and other judges sincerely interpret legal texts. He is
able to explain the interplay of law and politics in the institutional context
without delving into the details of the decision making process for specific and
concrete cases (though this question apparently intrigues him). Yet, the secret to
creating the fully integrated law-politics emulsion can be discovered only at the
micro-level. One must start with the presupposition that the justices sincerely
interpret legal texts-that the law matters-but then ask: How? How do the
justices interpret 1legal
texts? Or, in other words, how do the justices emulsify
59
politics and law?
2. The Emulsification of Law and Politics: Institutional Interpretivism
To answer this question-the how?--one needs to focus on the heart of the
adjudicative process: the interpretation of legal texts and doctrines. As Gillman
recognizes, judges feel duty-bound to interpret and apply legal materials, such
as case precedents, statutes, and constitutional provisions. 160 And, also as
Gillman recognizes, legal interpretation is not mechanical.' 6' But what does it
mean to say that interpretation is not mechanical? In short, no method (or
mechanical process) enables one to access some pre-existing and pristine
textual meaning. 62 Interpretation is not an arithmetic problem where one adds
the numbers and indubitably arrives at the correct answer.1 63 This is not to say,

159. For Gillman, the interpretive turn in political science suggests that, instead of examining judges
only from an external or behavioral perspective, political scientists should recognize that judicial
actions are meaningful to the judges themselves. Gillman, therefore, emphasizes the institutional
mission of the Supreme Court as imbuing the justices' actions (votes, decisions, and opinions) with
meaning. Gillman, supra note 141, at 78-80. But the interpretive turn can also urge us to examine
more deeply the interpretive processes themselves in judicial practices. E.g., Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) (criticizing Fiss's conceptualization of interpretation); Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982) (drawing on Fish's writings to explain
interpretation). In other words, if judicial practices are meaningful to judges, as Gillman emphasizes,
then one might further ask how such practices are meaningful. That is, how does interpretation (of
texts, for example) actually work?
160. Gillman, supra note 140, at 80; Whittington, supra note 60, at 623.
161. Gillman, supra note 43, at 485-86.
162. HANs-GEoRG GADAw.R, TRUTH AND MErHOD xxi, 89, 137, 140, 144, 159, 164-65, 295, 309, 462,
477-91 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989). For discussions of
Gadamer's hermeneutics, see GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUrIcs, TRADImON, AND REASON
(1987); JOEL C. WENsHEmER, GADAMFR's HEamaENCEtmcs: A READING OF TRUm AND METHOD (1985).
163. Dworkin explains that there is "no algorithm" to ascertain the right answer. RONALD DWORrN,
How Law is Like Literature,in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160 (1985).
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though, that there is no correct or right answer to interpretive disputes." 64 Yet,
the only means for gleaning the correct meaning of a text is through interpreta65
tion itself. Judges, quite simply, must interpret legal texts and doctrines. 1
So judges must interpret, and interpretation is never mechanical. How, then,
does interpretation occur? Most important, an interpreter who turns to a text
must always do so from within his or her horizon. 16 6 Literally, the horizon is the
distance that one can see from one's current position or place. The concept of
the horizon, therefore, is both enabling and constraining: We can see as far as
the end of the horizon, but we can see no farther. Metaphorically, the interpretive horizon is the range of possible understandings or interpretations that an
individual brings to any text. We are empowered to understand texts, but we are
also limited to understandings within our respective horizons. 167 And hence, we
find politics at the heart of the interpretive process: How, after all, does one's
horizon form? The horizon is constituted by an uncertain amalgamation of
one's interests, prejudices, expectations, and values, all of which are imbued in
the individual by prior experiences of culture, politics, and one's structural
position in society.' 68 Research in cognitive psychology elucidates. "All mental
processing draws closely from one's background knowledge," writes Dan
Simon.169 "A decision to cross a street, for example, is contingent on one's
experience-born knowledge about vehicles, motion, and driver behavior. A
choice to form a friendship is influenced by one's knowledge of cues for
trustworthiness, love, selfishness, and the like."' 70 Given this formative process,
the interpretive horizon is never static. An individual's horizon moves because
of changing experiences of culture, politics, and societal structures. 17 ' As Simon
fixed."' 17 2 Instead, new
puts it, one's "background belief system ...is hardly
1 73
experiences can cause "background beliefs [to] shift."'
Whenever the Supreme Court justices decide a case, they must interpret legal
texts, including the Constitution, statutes, and case precedents. In interpreting
legal texts, including doctrines from precedents, the justices necessarily do so
164. RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE

119 (1985).
165. Juirgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in COrEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS
181, 183 (Josef Bleicher ed., 1980); Jirgen Habermas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, in
UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 335, 357 (Fred R. Dallmayr & Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977).
For more extensive philosophical discussions of interpretation, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem
of Critique: TriangulatingHabermas, Derrida,and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 Contemp. Pol.
Theory 296, 299-315 (2005); Stephen M. Feldman, Made For Each Other: The Interdependence of
Deconstructionand PhilosophicalHermeneutics, 26 PHIL. & SOC. CRMCIsM 51, 53-63 (2000).
166. GADAMER, supra note 162, at 282-84, 302, 306.
167. Id. at 133.
168. See id. at 282-84, 295, 302-09 (discussing interpretation from within the horizon).
169. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision-Making,
71 U. CHI. L. REV.511, 536 (2004). Simon is a professor of law and psychology.
170. Id.
171. See GADAMER, supra note 162, at 282, 293, 461-63 (discussing how traditions change).
172. Simon, supra note 169, at 536.
173. Id.
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from the vantage of their respective horizons, which are, in part, necessarily
political. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the justices sincerely interpret legal
texts and doctrines, and their sincere interpretations coincide with their political
preferences and allegiances.' 7 4 Put in different words, a proper appreciation of
the interpretive process reveals precisely why politics matters in legal interpretation: Justices sincerely interpret legal texts, and politics (as part of the
horizon) always shapes sincere interpretation. In short, politics is integral to
legal interpretation.
This explanation of the interpretive process has two implications. First,
justices and other judges will rarely experience a conflict between their sincere
interpretations of legal texts and their political orientations exactly because
politics shapes interpretation. 75 Second, we can appreciate how interpreters
come to disagree about textual meaning. Suppose two Supreme Court justiceslet's say, Justices Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg-confront an establishmentclause issue that requires them to interpret the first amendment. They both
sincerely interpret the constitutional text and relevant precedents, yet they
ultimately disagree about the correct interpretation. Such disagreement suggests
neither that one of the justices is insincere-being disingenuous about the best
interpretation-nor that a best answer does not exist. 176 Rather, disagreement
arises because the justices approach the*constitutional text from significantly
different, albeit overlapping, horizons. Their horizons overlap because, in part,
both justices have been trained and immersed in the culture of the American
legal community, but their horizons diverge because, in part, they have different
political commitments.' 7 7 Scalia's conservative politics shapes his interpretive
horizon, while Ginsburg's liberal politics shapes her horizon. The justices, in
this situation, can attempt to persuade each other of the correct interpretation,
and they might do so. Yet, because interpretation is not mechanical-no method
can prove the correct answer--disagreement might persist. Such disagreement,
it should be clear, is not due to a failure of the interpretive process; rather it is
part-and-parcel of the interpretive process. One can never escape the horizonbound nature of interpretation.

174. Stephen M. Feldman, Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie? The Politicsof Adjudication, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 31-32 (2008) [hereinafter Feldman, Politics]; Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law
or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision
Making, 30 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 89, 109-10 (2005) [hereinafter Feldman, Rule]; see BUrmoN, supra note
55, at 35-68 (arguing that judges have a duty to decide in good faith according to the law).
175. Such conflict, though, is possible. Feldman, Politics, supra note 174, at 38-39; Feldman, Rule,
supra note 174, at 110-16.
176. Feldman, Politics, supra note 174, at 32; Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial
Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 122-23 (1998) (explaining how, from a psychological vantage,
judges authentically perceive themselves as reaching the correct decision).
177. Psychological research suggests that "[t]he socialization that starts in law school and continues
throughout one's legal career causes those who are trained in this tradition to accept and internalize
appropriate norms of decision making." EnEFN BRAMAN, LAw, POLMCS, AND PERCEIrON: How Poucv
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONNG 28 (2009); see Feldman, Rule, supra note 174, at 103
(emphasizing the learning of legal traditions).
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At the same time, Supreme Court adjudication does have an end point or
conclusion: namely, when the justices vote and decide a case. That is, the
institutional or structural position of the Courit in our governmental system-at
the apex of our judiciaries--differentiates Supreme Court adjudication from
many other interpretive enterprises. 17 8 When the justices vote and decide a case,
they terminate their interpretive debates about the relevant legal materials, at
least temporarily---even though the justices themselves have no more access
than anybody else to a mechanical method for resolving interpretive disputes.
Compare a Supreme Court case to a dispute between two English professors
over the interpretation of Franz Kafka's Metamorphosis.179 Like Scalia and
Ginsburg, the two English professors can attempt to persuade each other of the
superiority of their respective interpretations. 'Gregor's transformation into a
gigantic insect is merely symbolic,' says the first English professor. 'No, Gregor
really turns into a bug,' says the second. They can offer reasons for their
positions and attempt to refute the other's reasons. But, ultimately, their dispute
might never end because there is no institutional mechanism for reaching a
conclusion. But when Supreme Court justices disagree about the best interpretation of the first amendment or any other legal text, there is an institutional
means for ending the adjudicative dispute. The justices vote, and the majority
wins. Crucially, though, this institutional mechanism does not actually resolve
the interpretive dispute. The justices might continue to disagree about the best
interpretation of the text, as might lawyers, other judges, and law professors,
but the adjudicative dispute is, for all intents and purposes, over. 8 0 The justices
will move on to the next case on the docket. The existence of an institutional
mechanism for culminating adjudicative disputes does not, however, change the
nature of interpretation. There still is no mechanical process or method for
resolving the interpretive disagreement.
Because this explanation of the fully-integrated, law-politics emulsion accentuates both the nature of interpretation and the Court's institutional position, I
refer to it as institutional interpretivism. 18 1 Two virtues of institutional interpretivism should be underscored. First, it harmonizes with the separate bodies of
empirical evidence suggesting that law and politics both influence Supreme

178. Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the
Assumptions of InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship, 41 Duo, L.J. 191, 232-33 (1991); Fish, supra
note 159, at 756.
179. FRANZ KAFKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS, IN THE PENAL COLONY AND OTHER STORIES 67 (Willa Muir and
Edwin Muir trans., Shocken Books, 1995) (1948).
180. Litigants might have sufficient resources to seek additional remedies, such as a rehearing. In
some instances, a losing party might even seek to initiate the constitutional amendment process to
overturn a Supreme Court decision. Feldman, Rule, supra note 174, at 105 & nn.15-16.
181. Gillman uses the term, "interpretive institutionalism." GILLMAN, supra note 140, at 78. Because
he puts greater emphasis on institutionalism, while I am emphasize interpretivism, I have switched the.
ordering of the terms. I previously have called this approach an interpretive-structural theory. Feldman,
Rule, supra note 174, at 99-124.
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Court decisionmaking. Both these bodies of evidence, which include quantitative and qualitative elements, can be valid because law and politics coincide
in the vast majority of cases. t8 2 In a book-length study, Michael A. Bailey and
Forrest Maltzman provide quantitative support for some such type of lawpolitics emulsion: "Our evidence suggests a nuanced portrait of the Supreme
of policy-motivated but legally
Court and the choices justices make, a ' portrait
83
and institutionally constrained justices.'
Second, institutional interpretivism facilitates the introduction of an important distinction: politics writ large versus politics writ small. 184 In judicial
decision making, politics writ large occurs if a justice or judge purposefully or
self-consciously pursues political goals qua political goals (either preferences or
allegiances) when deciding a case. Politics writ small occurs if a justice or judge
sincerely interprets the relevant legal texts when deciding a case, and in doing
so, simultaneously decides in accord with his or her political preferences or
allegiances. 185 All-politics and oil-and-water approaches are premised on politics writ large. Obviously, attitudinalists and all-politics regimists maintain that
the justices purposefully pursue either their political preferences (attitudinalists)
or the goals of the predominant political order (regimists). Oil-and-water approaches assume that politics writ large enters the judicial calculus whenever
the law runs out. If a justice encounters a gap in the legal doctrine, for instance,
then the justice justifiably pursues politics writ large. But institutional interpretivism posits that justices decide according to a politics writ large in only extraordinary cases. In the vast majority of cases, the justices take seriously their duty to
interpret and apply the relevant legal texts and doctrines as best as possible. Of
course, according to institutional interpretivism, politics is integral to legal
interpretation, so the justices' sincere interpretatiohs coincide with their political

182. Political scientist Lawrence Baum explains the "methodological concept, behavioral equivalence, which means that we cannot distinguish between two possible causes of a pattern of behavior
when the effects of the two causes would be the same." Lawrence Baum, Law and Policy: More and
Less than a Dichotomy, in WHAT's LAW GOT To Do WITH IT? 71, 76 (Charles G Geyh ed., 2011).
183. MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT. LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 15-16 (2011). Bailey and Maltzman summarize three themes that emerge
from their quantitative studies: "First, justices are influenced by more than just the policy preferences
emphasized by the attitudinal model. Second, law matters for justices. Third, the influence of specific
legal doctrines varies across justices." Id. at 143; see Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman,
Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court,
102 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 369 (2008) (reaching similar conclusions); CASS R. SUNSTEN, ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (arguing that quantitative studies
suggest that both political ideology and legal doctrine influence federal court of appeals judges). It is
worth noting that Bailey and Maltzman's methodology retains a vestige of an oil and water approach
insofar as they attempt to distinguish the effects of law and politics through their quantitative measures.
184. See Feldman, Politics, supra note 174, at 18-19, 30-37 (distinguishing politics writ large from
writ small).
185. Cf. Tamanaha, supra note 29, at 187-89 (distinguishing cognitive framing from willful
judging).
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goals and allegiances. In other words, sincere legal interpretation is politics writ
small. 186

Once again, cognitive psychology strongly supports the concepts of institutional interpretivism and politics writ small. Research demonstrates that when
an individual confronts a complex decision, his or her cognitive system will
shift "toward a state of coherence with either one of the decision alternatives. 1 87 Decision makers' motivations or goals, including legal and political
goals, substantially affect "their mental processes" and contribute toward this
shift to coherence. 18 8 Thus, according to "coherence-based reasoning research,"
when a justice (or other judge) decides a case, the justice's legal and political
views will ultimately tend to coincide rather than conflict.' 89 Psychologists
agree that this tendency to reach coherent conclusions is often unconscious.
"[A] judge who identifies as a liberal Democrat may know that she favors
affirmative action," explains Eileen Braman,' 90 "but she may not be aware of
whether (or how) that policy preference influences her interpretation of evidence and/or legal authority in cases involving that issue."' 9 ' Most important,
an individual's coherence-based reasoning in accordance with his or her goals is
perfectly natural. As Simon concludes, shifts toward coherent conclusions "do
not represent conscious, strategic, or deceitful conduct on the part of a decisionmaker; rather, they are' 92the natural consequence of the normal mechanisms of
cognitive processing."'
III.

RAMIFICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETIVISM

A. ForScholars
For legal and political science scholars, institutional interpretivism has important research ramifications. Of course, law professors and political scientists
can continue to separate law and politics. They can be purists, relying respectively on all-law or all-politics approaches, or they can be oil-and-water scholars, mixing law and politics but ultimately deeming them independent and
separable. And, realistically, we should expect most legal scholars and political
scientists to continue along these well-worn paths partly because it is easier to

186. To be clear, I am not attempting to specify the precise degree to which politics influences the

justices in any particular case.
187. Simon, supra note 169, at 517.
188. BRAMAN, supra note 177, at 29; Simon, supra note 169, at 541-42 (emphasizing the importance
of motivated reasoning). For a recent discussion and application of the psychological concept of
motivated reasoning in a legal setting, see Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article ll's
Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
373, 444-48 (2012).
189. Simon, supra note 170, at 517.
190. BRAMAN, supra note 178, at 30.
191. See id. at 157-58 (discussing unconscious influences); Simon, supra note 169, at 545-46
(discussing lack of awareness).
192. Simon, supra note 169, at 545-46.
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do so than to strike out in different directions. Political scientists refer to this
phenomenon as "path dependence."' 193 Institutional arrangements develop because individuals naturally follow behavioral patterns they have previously
followed. The past facilitates the present and the future. In light of path
dependence, one should expect most legal scholars and political scientists to
follow the paths of their respective disciplines. 94 This disciplinary loyalty is
not necessarily bad. Disciplines provide tools that can open doors to knowledge.
To take one example, political scientists' methods of quantification have led to
valuable insights about the persistent influence of politics on Supreme Court
adjudication. Thus, following their disciplinary paths, purists and oil-and-water
scholars can continue to make important contributions to our knowledge of
judicial decision making.
Yet, these scholars will nonetheless be omitting a large part of the decisionmaking phenomenon. Disciplines provide methods for gaining knowledge but simultaneously constrain the outlooks (or horizons) of practitioners. For instance, a
political scientist committed to quantification methods will limit his or her
research to events or causes that can be reduced to numeric data (read: quantified). 195 A purist, rejecting interdisciplinary approaches, will leave much of the
Supreme Court puzzle scattered and unexamined. All-law scholars will be blind
to political influences on Supreme Court adjudication, while all-politics scholars
will continue to dismiss legal reasoning in judicial opinions as either subterfuge
or delusional nonsense. Oil-and-water scholars at least will account for both law
and politics, but they nonetheless will disregard the emulsification of the two
within the adjudicative process.
Law and politics together course through Supreme Court decisions and
opinions. Only a scholar who recognizes the fully integrated emulsion will be
able to explore the richness of the law-politics dynamic. Consider the Affordable CareAct Case 96-particularly its commerce power component. Congress
had invoked the commerce power to justify its enactment of the Affordable
Care Act's individual mandate, which requires most Americans to maintain
"minimum essential" health insurance coverage. 197 The individual mandate
compels individuals to purchase health insurance even if they would otherwise
prefer not to do so. Crucial to the Act's viability, the individual mandate forces
practically all Americans, including healthy ones, to share the costs of medical
care and health insurance. Chief Justice Roberts's opinion ultimately upheld the

193. Eileen Braman & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Path Dependence in Studies of Legal Decision-making,
in WHAT's LAw GoT To Do WrrH IT? 114, 115-16 (Charles G. Geyh ed., 2011).
194. Id. at 117-18.
195. SEGAL Er AL., supra note 8, at 20-21.
196. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
197. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010). If an individual is not exempt from the mandate, he or she
can satisfy it by purchasing insurance from a private company. Starting in 2014, individuals who do not
comply with the mandate must pay a "penalty" to the Internal Revenue Service along with their taxes.
26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(c), 5000A (g)(1) (Supp. IV 2010).
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individual mandate as constitutional pursuant to Congress's taxing power, 98 but
when Roberts focused on the commerce power, he concluded that Congress had
acted unconstitutionally.19 9 On this latter point, the other conservative justicesScalia, Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Anthony Kennedy-fully agreed. 2"° They
nonetheless jointly dissented and refused to join Roberts's opinion primarily
because they disagreed with his taxing power analysis.2 ° '
Focusing on the commerce power, one can readily analyze the ACA Case
from an all-politics perspective, even though Roberts explicitly insisted that
politics did not influence the justices.2 °2 For decades, starting long before the
Court decided the ACA Case in 2012, political conservatives had been waging a
war against so-called big government. They constantly criticized Congress, in
particular, for its attempts at social engineering, especially for liberal objectives.
Most conservatives traced expansive congressional power to the New Deal and
denounced the Court's 1937 acceptance of such power.20 3 Numerous conservative scholars called for the Court to reverse "the mistakes of 1937.,204 From the
conservative vantage, Congress repeatedly got things wrong, not only by pursuing the wrong goals but by passing laws that produced unforeseen detrimental
consequences. For instance, liberals intended affirmative action programs to
increase equality, but conservatives charged that such programs (whether congressionally or otherwise imposed) produced instead both a culture of victimhood
among its minority beneficiaries and a sense of resentment among whites. 20 5
Given this background, the Court's conclusion in the ACA Case vis-A-vis
Congress's commerce power was all too predictable. Quite simply, the five
conservative justices-Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy-outvoted
the four liberal justices-Stephen Breyer, Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan-and, therefore, reached the conservative result. They invalidated
liberal legislation, constrained congressional power, and in so doing, chipped
away at big government. Indeed, the Court's diminishment of Congress's
commerce power, in particular, was especially significant because, among all
congressional powers, the commerce power had long been the broadest and
most important.20 6

198. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599-600.
199. Id. at 2586-89.
200. Id. at 2644, 2648-49 (joint dissent).
201. Id. at 2650-55 (joint dissent).
202. Id. at 2577, 2579, 2608.
203. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
204. Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 5, 20 (1988-1989); see
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J.,concurring) (stating that the Court took a
"wrong turn" in 1937); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, No. 1, 1995, at 83,
84 (arguing for a return to the Constitution-in-exile).
205. NATHAN GLAZER, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (1978).
206. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (relying on
commerce power to uphold civil rights statute).
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Indeed, even when Roberts reasoned that Congress had acted constitutionally
pursuant to its taxing power, one can discern political calculation. By ultimately
upholding the individual mandate and most of the Affordable Care Act, Roberts
created a political shield around the Court, albeit a temporary one. If Roberts
and the other conservative justices had invalidated the entire statute, liberal
scholars undoubtedly would have condemned the decision as a pure political
power grab, akin to Bush v. Gore.2 °7 And the public likely would have understood the case similarly. But when Roberts ostensibly reached the liberal result
by voting to uphold the individual mandate (pursuant to the taxing power), he
reinforced his claim that the Court decides according to law, without regard for
politics. 20 8 As Roberts declared during his confirmation hearings, "Judges are

like umpires-umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. '2° Moreover, by
ultimately invoking the taxing power to uphold the Act, Roberts forced the
individual mandate into the most unpalatable of current political categories: a
new tax. Conservative media reports immediately declared that Obama and the
Democrats had clandestinely raised taxes. 210 All in all, the ACA Case looks like
a successful political outing for the Chief Justice.
But was it only politics? An all-law scholar could just as readily emphasize
Roberts's legal reasoning. In United States v. Lopez, decided in 1995, the Court
had articulated a doctrinal framework for determining the scope of Congress's
commerce power. 211 Lopez held that Congress had overstepped its power when
it enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA), a generally applicable law
that proscribed the possession of firearms at school. The majority opinion began
by asserting that the Court would apply a rational basis test, which the Court
had been applying to commerce power issues since 1937.212 The Lopez Court,
however, reformulated the doctrine to impose judicially enforceable limits on
Congress. Under this new or modified rational basis test, as2 13the Court explained,
Congress can regulate "three broad categories of activity.',
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though
the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' com207. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
208. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577, 2579, 2608 (2012).
209. Robert Schwartz, Like They See 'Em, THE NEW YORK TMES (Oct. 6, 2005), http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/10/06/opinion/O6schwartz.html?_r=O.
210. E.g., Merrill Matthews, Is ObamaCare The Largest Tax Increase In U.S. History?, FORES
(June 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.comsites/merril matthews/2012/06/29/is-obamacare-the-largest-taxincrease-in-u-s-history/; Robert Allen Bonelli, Obamacare:Seven New Taxes on Citizens Earning Less
than $250,000, BREaAxr (June 29, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/06/29/Sevennew-taxes, reprintedin Fox NArION, http://nation.foxnews.com/obamacare/2012/06/29/obamacare-sevennew-taxes-citizens-eaming-less-250000.
211. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
212. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
213. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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merce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.2 14
The Court quickly concluded that the GFSZA did not fit into the first two
categories: By restricting the possession of firearms at schools, the law targeted
neither the channels nor the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.2 15 Consequently, the Court focused on the third and potentially broadest category:
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. But after extensive analysis, the Court concluded that the law also could not be upheld under this
substantial-effects prong of Lopez.2 16
In the ACA Case, Roberts focused his commerce power discussion on the
Lopez doctrinal framework and specifically, as in Lopez, on the substantialeffects category.21 7 Roberts's legal reasoning emphasized two points: the first
dealt with the constitutional text; the second dealt with judicial precedents.
With regard to the constitutional text, Roberts naturally zoomed in on the
commerce clause.2 1 8 "The Constitution grants Congress the power to 'regulate
Commerce,"' Roberts explained.2 1 9 "The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated., 220 Thus, based on
the text, Roberts sharply distinguished between the regulation of commerce and
the creation of commerce. In the Affordable Care Act, Roberts reasoned,
Congress was creating rather than regulating commerce because the Act forced
individuals to buy health insurance even if they preferred otherwise. Even
within the somewhat flexible substantial-effects category of Lopez, this congressional creation of commerce was impermissible. With regard to judicial precedents, Roberts examined the Court's language in Lopez and several other
earlier commerce power decisions involving substantial effects. 22 Roberts
concluded: "As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce
power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe
the power as reaching 'activity.' It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when
quoting them. '22 2 Consequently, reasoning from the precedents, Roberts sharply
distinguished action from inaction: Congress can regulate action (or activity)
but not inaction (or inactivity). In the Affordable Care Act, Roberts reasoned,
Congress impermissibly attempted to regulate inaction, that is, the failure or
refusal to buy health insurance.
214. Id. at 558-59.
215. Id. at 559.

216. Id. at 561-65.
217. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585-86.
218. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
219. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (quoting U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (emphasis added by
Roberts).

220. Id. (emphasis in original).
221. For instance, Roberts cites Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942); and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
222. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
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In sum, one can reasonably analyze the ACA Case from either an all-politics
or an all-law perspective. Yet, both of these purist approaches would miss
much. If, instead, one were to follow institutional interpretivism, then a rich
law-politics emulsion would be discovered. Institutional interpretivism instructs
that, in most cases, the justices sincerely interpret the relevant legal texts and
doctrines. The ACA Case exemplifies this rule of thumb. Roberts (and the other
conservative justices) started with the commerce clause text and the Court's
doctrinal framework from Lopez. But Roberts, of course, interpreted those legal
materials from the position of his own horizon. In other words, he understood
the constitutional text and doctrine from the perspective of contemporary
conservative politics. Thus, Roberts inclined against a broad congressional
commerce power-against big government. But while Roberts (and the other
conservative justices) reached the conservative result, he did not disregard text
or doctrine. Neither did he disingenuously justify the outcome with post-hoc
legal reasoning. Roberts never flexed his institutional muscles so as to decide
pursuant to a politics writ large. He did not need to neglect professional norms
in such a blatant manner in order to achieve any latent political goals. Rather, he
merely needed to interpret the legal materials to the best of his abilities because
such interpretation itself embodied politics writ small. Roberts's political views
informed his legal interpretations.
One sees this combination of law and politics at the very center of the ACA
Case. Some historical background helps illuminate this phenomenon. From the
1890s through 1936 (the Lochner-era), the Court occasionally invalidated congressional actions by defining and enforcing judicial limits on the commerce
power.223 During this period, the justices typically reasoned pursuant to an a
priori formalism. The justices claimed to discern the existence, content, and
boundaries of certain preexisting categories of activities without inquiring into
the consequences of the activities. For instance, manufacturing might be deemed
to be an inherently local (as opposed to inherently national) activity, regardless
of the product manufactured, the resources used, or the social effects of the
manufacturing.2 24 If deemed local, then the activity was necessarily beyond
Congress's commerce power.225 Starting in 1937, however, the Court repudiated
such formalist reasoning in commerce power cases. 226 Instead, the Court ostensibly applied a rational basis test, though in practice, the Court consistently
deferred to the democratic process. The Court, in other words, refrained from
imposing judicial limits on congressional power. From the post-1937 perspec-

223. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
224. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
225. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act).
226. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937):
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tive, congressional overreaching was to be checked at the ballot box, not at the
courthouse.22 7
In reaction to these judicial developments, conservative constitutional scholars eventually joined the long-running conservative critique of big government. They began advocating for a return to a judicial formalism that would
constrain congressional power, as had been followed in pre-1937 commerce
power cases.2 28 Unsurprisingly, then, the conservative Lopez majority echoed
this scholarly position by casting its substantial-effects prong with a formalist
glean. More specifically, the Lopez Court introduced two a priori distinctions:
first, economic versus non-economic, 22 9 and second, national versus local. 230 If
an activity were either non-economic or local, then it could not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, according to the Lopez Court (and thus,
Congress could not permissibly regulate). 2 31 Hence, Lopez presented an elaborate doctrinal framework for determining the scope of congressional power.
Pursuant to the Lopez reformulated rational basis test, Congress can regulate in
three categories: the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and those activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. To determine whether a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, one must ascertain whether the activity is, first, economic or noneconomic in nature, and second, national or local in concern.23 2 Significantly,
this doctrine arose from and is animated by a conservative political principle:
namely, that the courts should define and enforce judicial limits on Congress's
commerce power pursuant to an a priori formalism.
In the ACA Case, the liberal Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part, acknowledged that she must apply the Lopez doctrine to the issue of
Congress's commerce power. Even so, she argued that "[s]traightforward application" of the doctrine led to an inescapable conclusion: The Affordable Care
Act's individual mandate was a constitutional exercise of the commerce power.2 33
Like Roberts, Ginsburg focused on the third category under the Lopez reformulated rational basis test: An activity that substantially affects interstate commerce falls within Congress's power. She then analyzed the regulated activity227. "[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce
Clause... is one of process rather than one of result." Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit

Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985). Between 1937 and the early 1990s, the Court upheld every challenged
congressional exercise of its commerce power, with the sole exception of a single 1976 case, which the
Court overruled within a decade. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
228. See supra note 205 (citing scholars criticizing mistakes of 1937).
229. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.

230. Id. at 567-68.
231. When the Lopez Court distinguished between "what is truly national and what is truly local,"
id. "its language echoed the Court's pre-1937 language distinguishing "a purely federal matter" from "a
matter purely local in its character." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274-76 (1918).
232. The Lopez Court also suggested that Congress should make detailed findings to support a
conclusion that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
233. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2617 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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health insurance and medical care (or health care, in general)-under the two a
priori distinctions articulated in Lopez. She reasoned that the health care market
is both economic in nature and national in scope. 23 Individuals who, prior to
the Act, chose to go uninsured, inevitably needed to avail themselves of medical
services. At some point in time, they entered into and substantially affected the
commerce of the national health care market. Ginsburg pointed out that health
care providers raise their prices and insurance companies increase their premiums so that insured individuals pay more than their fair share in order to
cover costs for the uninsured. 235 "Congress found that the cost-shifting...
'increases family [insurance] premiums by on average over $1,000 a year."' 23 6
Thus, it is "[b]eyond dispute," Ginsburg wrote, that "Congress had a rational
basis for concluding
that the uninsured, as a class, substantially affect interstate
2 37
commerce."
Roberts disagreed with Ginsburg's conclusion. Even so, he did not emphasize
weaknesses with Ginsburg's application of the Lopez doctrine.23 8 Rather, he
elaborated the doctrine by applying the underlying principle: The Court should
define and enforce judicial limits on Congress's commerce power pursuant to an
a priori formalism. He pushed the formalist approach of Lopez into new
territory in the ACA Case. When Roberts focused on the text of the commerce
clause, he interpreted it to create a previously unrecognized a priori distinction:
regulation versus creation. Congress could regulate commercial activity, but
could not create it, as in the Affordable Care Act. 239 And when Roberts focused
on the Court's precedents, he interpreted them to create yet another previously
unrecognized a priori distinction: action versus inaction. Congress could regulate action (or activity), but could not regulate inaction (or inactivity), again as
in the Affordable Care Act.24 ° In other words, Roberts's legal reasoning vis- vis the constitutional text and judicial precedents flowed from his commitment
to a principle underlying the Lopez decision-a formalist principle that had
arisen from the conservative political critique of post-1937 Supreme Court
commerce clause decisions.
I suspect that some readers will react by saying, 'Yes, but.... ' 'Yes, but isn't
the ACA Case really about politics-specifically, the imposition of a conservative program aimed at constraining congressional power (big government)?' Or,
'yes, but isn't the ACA Case really about the law-specifically, the interpreta-

234. For example, many of the insurance companies are national. Id. at 2617 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. Id. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. Id. at 2617 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

238. See id. at 2586 nn.3-4, 2587 n.5, 2589 n.6 (addressing some of Ginsburg's arguments in
footnotes).
239. Id. at 2586.
240. Id. at 2587.
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tion of the commerce clause text and the application of the Lopez reformulated
rational basis test?' Both reactions would be reasonable. But by focusing solely
on either politics or law, one Would miss the dynamics of the law-politics
integration in Roberts's opinion. Only by attending to both law and politics can
one understand how Roberts's interpretation of constitutional text and application of legal doctrine manifested politics writ small. Roberts emphasized the
precise language of the commerce clause but interpreted it from his conservative political horizon, manifesting hostility to congressional action. Likewise,
Roberts emphasized the Lopez doctrinal framework-the reformulated rational
basis test-but he applied and elaborated it in accord with his conservative
politics. And only by attending to both law and politics can one understand the
potential legal and political significance of Roberts's opinion in the future. In
particular, just as the Lopez reformulated rational basis test has guided lower
court and Supreme Court commerce power cases toward politically conservative conclusions-the invalidation of congressional actions- Roberts's elaboration of the doctrine in accord with a priori formalism is likely to do the same in
the future. 24 ' To be sure, Roberts's doctrinal moves do not render these conservative conclusions inevitable, but they became more likely after than before the
ACA Case. Courts not only might apply the new formalist distinctions of the
ACA Case-regulation versus creation, and action versus inaction-but might
also be emboldened to identify additional formalist distinctions and categories.
In this light, the emulsification of law and politics-specifically, the intertwining of legal doctrine and political conservatism-might well be the most
interesting aspect of this landmark case.
Moving beyond the ACA Case, the interrelated concepts of institutional
interpretivism, politics writ small, and the law-politics emulsion raise an interesting (APD-like) point about the interaction of politics and law over time. When
the justices interpret the law and decide a case in accord with politics writ
small, the justices' political orientations tend to be shaped- by current political
disputes. For example, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, conservatives
24 2
railed against the supposed activism of the Warren and early Burger Courts.
This attack on activism led conservative jurists and legal scholars to advocate
for judicial restraint: The justices should defer to legislative judgments rather
than impose their own political preferences.2 43 Thus, in commercial speech

241. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating Violence Against Women
Act as beyond congressional power); Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11 th Cir. 2011) (invalidating individual mandate in Affordable Care Act).
242. See Morton Keller, America's Three Regimes 228 (2007) (discussing criticisms of Warren
Court); William N. Eskridge, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on ConstitutionalLaw
in the Twentieth Century, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 2062, 2375-82 (2002) (discussing criticisms of Warren and

Burger Courts).
243. E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,

17(1971).
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cases of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Rehnquist argued that the Court ought
to defer to legislatively imposed restrictions on commercial advertising. 2 " But
political outlooks frequently change more rapidly and readily than do legal
doctrines, which are solidified pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis. Consequently, doctrine that appears to have a conservative (or liberal) slant today
might appear differently tomorrow, as the surrounding political environment
changes. Gonzales v. Raich, a commerce power case decided after Lopez but
before the ACA Case, demonstrates how doctrinal frameworks can slide in
unexpected political directions because of changing contexts.24 5 Raich presented conservatives (and liberals) with a paradox because the challengers
argued that Congress had exceeded its power by enacting a law that proscribed
the possession of marijuana. 246 The conservative justices generally would lean
toward restricting congressional power, as they had previously in Lopez and
would subsequently in the ACA Case, but some of those same conservative
justices might also wish to allow the government to impose moral values by
restricting the use of drugs.24 7 In the end, the moderately conservative Kennedy
flipped his vote and joined the liberal justices to uphold the statute. Justice John
Paul Stevens wrote a majority opinion that retained the Lopez doctrinal framework but reasoned that marijuana possession substantially affected interstate
commerce. Even Scalia, too, voted to uphold this statute, though he refused to
join Stevens's opinion. Instead, Scalia's concurrence (in the judgment) emphasized that this case raised a factually unique situation in which the necessary
and proper clause empowered Congress to regulate drug possession.2 48 Notwithstanding Raich, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have displayed an aggressive
conservative righteousness in congressional power cases that contrasts sharply
and ironically with the conservative calls for judicial restraint from the Warren
and Burger Court years. 249 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have set forth on
one of the "most notable binges of congressional-law striking in history., 250 In
fact, the Rehnquist Court invalidated more congressional acts than had any

244. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 583-85 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 781-90 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
245. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
246. Id.at 10-15.
247. Stephen M. Feldman, Neoconservative Politics and the Supreme Court: Law, Power, and
Democracy 114-39 (2013).
concurring in the judgment).
248. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 34-40 (Scalia, J.,
249. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of the United States of America: A Contextual Analysis 22829 (2009) (discussing changes in judicial conservatism); Stephen M. Feldman, Conservative Eras
in Supreme CourtDecision Making: Employment Division v. Smith, JudicialRestraint,and Neoconservatism, 32 CAiDozo L. REV. 1791 (2011) (distinguishing two eras of conservative judicial decision
making).
250. Barry Friedman, The Cycles of ConstitutionalTheory, 67 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRons. 149, 161
(2004).
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previous Court; from 1995 to 2001 alone, the Court struck down thirty federal
laws, more than the Warren Court invalidated from 1953 to 1969.251
B. For Supreme Court Justices
Oddly, from one perspective, institutional interpretivism is relatively insignificant to the practice of Supreme Court decision making. Thomas Kuhn's historical study of the Copernican Revolution can help illuminate the relationship
between the scholarly insight of institutional interpretivism, on the one hand,
and Supreme Court practices, on the other. From the fourth century, B.C.E., to
the sixteenth century, C.E.-that is, before Copernicus-the predominant cosmological outlook was the "two-sphere universe.,

25 2

"[T]he earth was a tiny

sphere suspended stationary at the geometric center of a much larger rotating
sphere which carried the stars," explains Kuhn. 253 "The sun moved in the vast
space between the earth and the sphere of the stars. Outside of the outer sphere
there was nothing at all-no space, no matter, nothing. 2 54 Copernicus revolutionized the science of cosmology by proposing that the sun, not the earth, was the
center of a solar system with revolving planets, including the earth. 255 Kuhn
notes, however, that, even in the twentieth century, the simpler conception of
the two-sphere universe remained functionally useful for many people, including navigators and surveyors. The post-Copernican scientific model of the
universe proved too complex for such practical enterprises. Kuhn elaborates:
"Most handbooks of navigation or surveying open with some sentence like this:
'For present purposes we shall assume that the earth is a small stationary sphere
25
whose center coincides with that of a much larger rotating stellar sphere."' 6
In other words, the two-sphere model continues to work successfully in certain
practices, although scientists no longer accept it as true or representative of
2 57

reality.

The practice of Supreme Court decision making can be understood similarly.
Scholars might reject the simplicity of an all-law (or all-politics) approach. An
increasing number might recognize the fully integrated emulsion of law and
politics. Some might even accept the concept of institutional interpretivism. But
institutional interpretivism presents a far more complex depiction of Supreme
Court adjudication than do purist and oil-and-water approaches. Indeed, even
some political scientists will undoubtedly reject institutional interpretivism
exactly because it is too complex; at this point in time, it cannot be reduced to
251. See Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History 2 (2004); David M.
O'Brien, Storm Center 31 (8th ed. 2008).
252. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution 27 (1957).
253. Id.
254. Id.

255. Id. at 1-2.
256. Id. at 38.
257. Id. Likewise, certain practical enterprises continue to be based on Newtonian mechanics, even
though Einstein's relativity theory has supplanted it scientifically. Bryan Magee, Confessions of a
Philosopher 51-52 (1997).
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quantifiable criteria. To be certain, we can recognize the law-politics emulsion
and measure some aspects of it in quantifiable terms-for example, by using the
attitudinal model to measure the influence of political ideology-but ultimately,
our acceptance of the emulsion must be based partly on qualitative evidence.
Regardless, Kuhn's discussion of the Copernican Revolution suggests that
Supreme Court justices (and other judges) can continue to function in accordance with a simpler purist approach-specifically, an all-law approach.258
That is, the justices can and will sincerely interpret legal texts and doctrines.
They can and will avoid consciously considering their respective political views
and overtly discussing potential political consequences of decisions. They can
and will, in other words, spurn politics writ large. Thus, Roberts, Scalia, and
other justices can continue to declare that, in all honesty, they decide cases
pursuant to the rule of law. Perhaps, some justices might admit that they
occasionally consult policy factors in the limited manner permitted under an
oil-and-water approach. All in all, the practical enterprise of Supreme Court
decision-making has worked successfully in the past by following a legal
approach and can continue to do so in the future-without any conscious
consideration of institutional interpretivism or other fancy law-politics theory.
Of course, politics will nonetheless continue to work below the surface, as
politics writ small, as part of the law-politics emulsion embodied in legal
interpretation. In fact, the practice of Supreme Court decision making functions
so successfully partly because of politics writ small. Institutional interpretivism
and politics writ small assure that justices ordinarily experience a correspondence between their interpretive and political views. Consequently, justices
rarely confront the angst that would arise if their interpretive and political views
diverged: Should I follow the rule of law or my political ideology? Professional
and political forces would press in opposite directions. If such cases arose
frequently, they would strain the practical enterprise of adjudication. Justices
would constantly be questioning professional norms and the usefulness of
fidelity to those norms. Fortunately, then, such cases, creating a law-politics
angst, are extraordinary-exactly because politics writ small is integral to legal
interpretation.25 9 Scalia and the other justices, therefore, can go on their merry
ways, remaining oblivious to the law-politics emulsification.
Institutional interpretivism and the concomitant politics writ small, however,
do not demand heedless ignorance. A justice can be aware of a correspondence
between his or her interpretive and political views. To some justices, such
correspondence might seem serendipitous, even though it is not; the correspondence arises because of the nature of the interpretive process. In fact, some
justices might recognize the operation of institutional interpretivism, might
258. See Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987) (arguing
that theories of judicial decision making do not affect the practice).
259. See Patricia Ewick, Principles, Passions, and the Paradox of Modern Law: A Comment on
Bybee, 38 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 196, 199 (2013) (arguing that the combination of rule-oriented and
political-oriented views of legality help in "sustaining law's legitimacy").
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recognize how politics is integral to legal interpretation. Still, though, such a
justice would likely continue to follow professional norms and duties. The justice would continue to vote and decide in accord with his or her best interpretation of the relevant legal materials. For the most part, the practice of Supreme
Court decision making would continue as before. Only naivet6 would be lost.
Our insightful justice would merely be aware that political ideology always
informed legal interpretation. Most important, then, such awareness would not
be liberating. The justice would not be freed from his or her interpretive horizon
and suddenly able to interpret and apply pure law in a mechanical fashion,
free of political influence. Likewise, the justice would not be freed to follow his
or her politics indiscriminately. The professional norms of judicial decision
making would still compel the justice to interpret legal texts and doctrines as
best as possible. Escape to either a pure law or pure politics is impossible. 2"
IV. CONCLUSION

Law. Politics. Two words. The language, the terminology, drives us to
distinguish separate and independent concepts. Purists, in effect, conceive of
law and politics as ideal types. 261 Law is clear, logical, and ordered. Politics is
flexible, expedient, and deliberative. As such, law and politics are opposites.
Each is taboo to the other. Law destroys politics by enforcing rigidity, while
260. Some originalists now distinguish between interpretation and construction. Amy Barrett,
Lawrence B. Solum, Introduction: The Interpretation/ConstructionDistinction In Constitutional Law,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2010); Colby, supra note 35, at 731-34. From this perspective, the justices interpret the constitutional text to discern its original public meaning, but they then construct doctrines to
implement the meaning. For instance, the justices might read the establishment clause to mean that
there should be a wall of separation between church and state. Then, the justices would construct a
doctrine, such as the three-part Lemon test, which would facilitate implementing the wall of separation.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). On the one hand, I am agnostic about this distinction between interpretation and construction. From the perspective of institutional interpretivism,
the justices interpret both constitutional text and constitutional doctrine (developed in earlier cases).
Thus, the crucial component of legal interpretation-the law-politics emulsion--operates whether the
justices are focused on text or doctrine. Doctrine, in other words, is just another type of text. On the
other hand, I find this distinction misleading because it suggests that the justices can sometimes escape
the interpretive process-because construction is differentiated from interpretation-but such escape is
impossible. Construction, as the originalists conceive of it, is simply another instance of interpretation.
Moreover, the justices themselves rarely distinguish constitutional meaning from doctrine. Rather, they
are more likely to perceive their doctrinal statements as manifesting or capturing the textual meaning.
Finally, and most important, the distinction between interpretation and construction can lead some
theorists to reinscribe the law-politics dichotomy. For these theorists, interpretation is legal, primarily
for the courts, while construction is political, primarily for the legislatures. E.g., Keith E. Whittington,
Constitutional Interpretation 5-11 (1999). This division of labor between courts and legislatures might
also suggest that legal interpretation can be mechanical. See Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs.
The Lawyer's Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism,
23 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 295, 298 (2011) (criticizing new originalists who apparently believe that an old
dictionary provides an objective meaning for constitutional language). Institutional interpretivism, of
course, rejects the possibility of mechanical interpretation.
261. I acknowledge that some theorists whom I identify as oil-and-water types might be seeking
some form of emulsification theory, but the language-the separate terms, law and politics-reinscribes
the dichotomous conceptions of law and politics.
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politics corrupts law by injecting discretion and instrumentalism. But these
ideal types do not represent social reality. Law and politics are not opposites.
They are not separate and independent. Rather, they naturally draw together into
a stable emulsion in Supreme Court adjudication.
Think of Supreme Court decision making as mayonnaise. At a minimum,
mayonnaise contains an emulsification of both oil and egg yolks. Nevertheless,
one can look at mayonnaise and say, 'This is oil.' Or one can say, 'This is egg
yolks.' Each statement would be simultaneously right and wrong, at least in
part. After all, it is oil, and it is egg yolks. But exactly because the two join
together in a stable emulsion, it is also something very different. It is mayonnaise. In the same way, one can examine a Supreme Court decision and say,
'This is law.' Or one can say, 'This is politics.' Both statements would be
partially right and wrong. But in Supreme Court adjudication, law and politics
join together in a stable emulsion to make something else, a judicial decision.
Because this Article has focused on judicial decision making, and most jurists
and legal scholars follow either an all-law or an oil-and-water approach, I have
largely explored the means by which politics enters the judicial (or legal)
process. But in the law-politics emulsion, politics is not only integral to law;
law is also integral to politics. In fact, law permeates politics in multiple ways.
Inside the legal system itself, law channels or frames the manifestation of justices' (and other judges') political preferences and allegiances.2 62 Put in different words, because law matters, justices generally do not pursue politics writ
large, purposefully pursuing political goals qua political goals. A justice is not
the same as a legislator or a newspaper columnist advocating for a political
objective. Instead, justices implicitly pursue politics writ small as they sincerely
interpret legal texts and doctrines. Moreover, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed
nearly 200 years ago, many ostensible political disputes in America are transformed into legal issues and decided within the courts.26 3
Outside the legal system, the law still channels politics. For instance, when
the Supreme Court holds that white primaries are unconstitutional, then the
264
Democratic and Republican parties must modify their practices to comply.
When the Supreme Court holds that Congress cannot restrict the amount of
money that corporations spend on political campaigns, additional corporate
funding will flow into the next presidential campaign. 65
Finally, legal education affects politics both inside and outside the legal
system. Insofar as a law student learns legal texts and doctrines, learns to think
like a lawyer, then that student (and, later, graduate) will think about politics

262. Silverstein, supra note 18, at 16; Jeb Barnes, Law's Allure and an InterbranchPerspective on
Law and Politics, 35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1029, 1032-33 (2010). "Constitutional law provides the
structure within which politics occurs." Tushnet, supra note 249, at 227.
263. See Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 280 (Vintage Books ed. 1990).
264. See Tushnet, supra note 249, at 52-56; e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
265. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 310 (2010); Silverstein, supra note 18, at 152-74 (discussing
campaign finance).
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differently. What appears politically feasible and proper will change. 6 6 This
legal shaping of politics will occur whether the individual eventually practices
law on an everyday basis or is elected to a governmental position. Let's say the
individual is elected to a state legislature, and the legislature is considering a
bill that would limit marriage to only heterosexuals. Presumably, the lawyerlegislator would hesitate and at least consider whether such a statute would
violate equal protection. Quite simply, in the United States, politics does not
exist without law. One would be hard pressed to imagine a political question
that is not permeated through-and-through with legal elements. Perhaps, in a
utopian state of nature, individuals could negotiate politically without the prior
existence of law. But what would they negotiate about if there were no legal
concepts, like property and liberty? And, in any event, the United States is not a
utopian state of nature.
Even the definitions of law and politics revolve around the other. The
substance of law-what constitutes law-is always subject to political contestation. For political reasons, for example, a president might deny that an issue,
such as the legality of abortion, is a political issue and instead insist that it is
a constitutional (legal) question to be decided by the courts.26 7 Meanwhile, the
substance of politics-what constitutes politics-is always shaped by legal
structures. Is a societal group's pursuit of self-interest standard political fare, as
it would be constitutionally deemed during the post-World War II era, or is it the
corruption of politics, as it would be constitutionally deemed during the 1790s?269
Law and politics appear bound together in an aporetic dance of attraction and
repulsion, often pulled so close that they cannot be differentiated.

266. Braman, supra note 177, at 28; Baum, supra note 182, at 79.
267. Whittington, supra note 60, at 66.
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291-348 (2008) (discussing two democratic eras).

